⚔️Reputation Challenge
Go short on reputation
If Staking ETH in one's pool is equivalent to going Long on that pool owner's reputation, then Challenging someone is going Short on his/her reputation. Ideally, when there are people going Long and people going Short on each other's reputation, people's Trust Scores will converge at the most accurate possible values.
Challenging User A means: you pay [Challenge_fee] (in GOAT) and lock A's [Challenger_fund] (in ETH) to freeze [Defender_fund] (in ETH) of User A for a [Freeze_duration], and set a [Voter_share] which is how many percentage of the reward will be allocated to voters.
Input 1: Attacker_fund >= Defender_fund * Min_Attacker_fund_rate
Input 2: Defender_fund <= ETH_Earning of User A
Input 3: Max_freeze_duration > Freeze_duration >= Min_freeze_duration
Input 4: 0% <= Voter_share <= Max_voter_share
Leverage
Leverage = max( 1, Defender_fund x Freeze_duration / Challenger_fund / Freeze_duration_unit / (1 - Voter_share) )
Percentage of Yae vote required for Yae side to win = Yae_quorum = Leverage / (Leverage + 1)
The logic behind Leverage is the disadvantages of the Defender.
The less ETH Challenger wagers in comparison to Defender's frozen funds, the more disadvantageous it is for Defender.
The long Challenger freezes Defender's funds, the more disadvantageous it is for Defender.
The more Challenger shares the rewards with voters, the more disadvantageous it is for Defender. As Defender_fund is usually higher then Challenger_fund, voters are more inclined to voting for the Challenger.
Therefore, the higher Leverage is, the more disadvantageous it is for Defender. In return, it requires more vote for Challenger/Yae side to win. For example, if Leverage = 3, percentage of Yae vote required for Yae side to win = 3/(3+1) = 75%.
Quick Vote Advantage
Early voters will have a "Quick vote advantage," which diminishes with time.
Voting Power of each Voter = Boost_Vote_Power x Quick_vote_advantage x (1 - Past_time/Freeze_duration)
Each user can Vote only Yae or Nay, not both
Voters CANNOT cancel the vote, but can change the vote anytime. Every time a user changes his/her vote, it's equivalent to casting the vote anew, which means his/her Voting Power is recalculated (losing its Quick Vote Advantage).
Yae vote = sum of Voting Power of Yae Voters
Nay vote = sum of Voting Power of Nay Voters
Example
A has ETH_Earning = 1000 ETH; B uses 50 ETH to Freeze 500 ETH of A for 10 days, with Voter_share = 50%. Leverage = max(1, 500*10/50/100/0.5) = 2; Yes_quorum = 2 / (2 + 1) = 66.67%. After 10 days, if percentage of Yae vote >= 66.67%, Yae side wins; otherwise, Nay side wins.
If Defender's reputation is overvalued but Nay side wins, Defender may withdraws all earnings and vanish. In this case, Challenger wouldn't earn anything, but may gain trust the next time he/she Challenges someone else.
If you want to wager less ETH to freeze someone's more ETH, it's equivalent to using high Leverage in trading and accepting the possibility of being liquidated. In order to win, you need more Yae votes than Nay votes. Therefore, in order to Challenge and win, you need prepare an excessively convincing case against Defender, or else you might lose your funds easily.
If the Defender_fund:Challenger_fund ratio is 1:1, with voter share of 0%, for a duration of 100 days, whoever wins will double its frozen funds (earn as much as 100%) after 100 days, or an APR of 365%.
Percentage of Yae vote required for Yae side to win cannot be less than 50%.
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